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REGULATING CHANNEL CHECKS: 
CLARIFYING THE LEGALITY OF  
SUPPLY-CHAIN RESEARCH 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) 
began investigating an investment research practice known as “channel 
checking” to determine whether, in the SEC’s view, the practice violated 
the laws prohibiting trading illegally on the basis of material, non-public 
information, known informally as illegal insider trading. 1  In a channel 
check, an investment analyst communicates with suppliers and clients, as 
well as current and former employees of a company to obtain clues about 
the company’s performance. 2  The practice is most common among 
technology analysts, who often attempt to estimate how many product units 
a company like Apple expects to ship in the next quarter.3 Analysts also use 
channel checks to estimate the future performance and profitability of 
companies in other sectors, especially large retail and restaurant chains.4 
Channel checks help keep issuers honest, as it is not uncommon for a 
company to paint a rosy picture of its performance in the news, only to 
eventually reveal that sales are down, cash flow has dried up, and senior 
managers are using the company jet to ship their wives to Paris for fashion 
week. 
Channel checking has long been an industry-accepted practice, but the 
SEC’s investigation has caused concern among buy-side and third-party 
investment analysts for whom it is an important tool.5 Many professional 
investors, including hedge funds and investment advisers, are pulling back 
from the use of supply-chain research, channel checks, and expert 
networking firms.6 
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2014] Regulating Channel Checks 471 
This Note seeks to examine the investment research practice known as 
channel checking within the context of insider trading law and proposes an 
appropriate regulatory framework. It will also touch on and analyze the 
proper role of expert networking firms in channel checks to provide a 
clearer picture of how to prevent such firms from facilitating trading on 
illegally obtained insider information. The analysis will examine and 
critique the policy goals of current insider trading law and explain where 
channel checks and expert networks fit in. Finally, the proposed solutions 
will attempt to balance the competing interests of market fairness and 
market efficiency. 
Part I of this Note will provide a discussion of the current insider 
trading regime, with a truncated explanation of the judicial recognition of 
the insider’s duty to disclose or abstain, the development and expansion of 
tipper/tippee liability, and an introduction to the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading. Part II will comment on the current cases dealing with the 
use of supply-chain information in trading. Part III will explore the current 
legal status of supply-chain research, expert networks, and the mosaic 
theory of investment analysis. Part IV will identify and comment on some 
of the problems with the current enforcement regime. Part V will propose a 
solution based on principles of market efficiency and the constitutional 
authority of the SEC. 
I. THE CURRENT INSIDER TRADING REGIME 
Perhaps no form of white-collar crime has captured the public 
imagination as fully as illegal insider trading: “Insider trading is one of the 
few issues in securities regulation that has become a matter of cultural 
symbolism as well as legal controversy.”7 The very phrase “insider trading” 
conjures up images of wealthy executives sitting in glass-walled towers, 
lining their pockets at the expense of ordinary investors. In fact, much of 
the modern era of enforcement can be attributed to a legislative desire to 
punish the perceived greed of the already-rich using inside information to 
further build their wealth.8 
The phrase “insider trading” may refer to two separate types of trading, 
one of which is perfectly legal. 9  On one hand, it is perfectly legal for 
corporate insiders to sell their company’s stock, as long as they file reports 
with the SEC and comply with regulations designed to prevent the misuse 
of nonpublic information.10 On the other hand, illegal insider trading as 
governed by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
                                                                                                                 
 7. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND 
PREVENTION § 1.1 (2012). 
 8. Id.  
 9. See Insider Trading, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 
2014). 
 10. Id.  
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Exchange Act) occurs when a corporate insider or temporary insider, in 
connection with a purchase or sale of securities, knowingly omits or fails to 
disclose material facts to his counterparty. 11  In a modern securities 
transaction, this means that an insider must disclose any material facts he 
possesses to the market before trading in securities of his own company, or 
he must abstain from trading altogether.12 
The government has a number of statutes it can use to prosecute 
suspected insider traders, including section 16 of the Exchange Act,13 the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), 14 various mail and wire 
fraud statutes, and, less frequently, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (RICO).15 The most important statute in modern cases, 
and the one most relevant to this Note, is section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act,16 and SEC rule 10b-5 thereunder, prohibiting the use of manipulative 
and deceptive devices in connection with any purchase or sale of a 
security.17 The Exchange Act, from which the SEC derives its constitutional 
authority to prosecute insider trading and other forms of securities fraud, 
does not specifically prohibit insider trading.18 The SEC added rules 10b5-
1 19 and 10b5-2 20  in order to clarify its position on misappropriation of 
                                                                                                                 
 11. ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING 
FIELD 108–09 (1993). 
 12. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (Nov. 8, 1961) 
[hereinafter Cady, Roberts & Co. Release]. 
 13. NASSER ARSHADI & THOMAS H. EYSELL, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
INSIDER TRADING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 43 (1993). 
 14. Id. at 49. The ITSA allows the SEC to seek a civil penalty of up to three times profit or 
loss avoided for those found guilty of insider trading. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (2012).  
 15. ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13,  at 54.  
 16.  15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange— 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
 18. SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 3.  
 19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2014) defines trading “on the basis of” material nonpublic 
information as follows: 
Definition of “on the basis of.” Subject to the affirmative defenses in paragraph (c) of this 
section, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is “on the basis of” material nonpublic 
information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware 
of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale. 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (“For purposes of this section, a ‘duty of trust or confidence’ 
exists in the following circumstances, among others: (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain 
information in confidence . . . .”). 
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insider trading and make enforcement against such activity easier.21 The 
modern constitutional contours of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are wholly 
defined by Chiarella v. United States, Dirks v. SEC, and United States v. 
O’Hagan, the only three insider trading cases heard by the Supreme Court 
in the modern era.22 
In the first case, Vincent Chiarella, a mark-up man in the employ of a 
financial printer, was assigned to review a number of takeover proposals.23 
Chiarella was able to deduce the takeover targets from the content of the 
proposals, despite the fact that the names of the target companies were 
obscured or altered.24 He then purchased shares in the target companies and 
sold them after the takeovers were made public, netting about $30,000.25 In 
this decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 1980, the Court sharply 
limited the “disclose-or-abstain” rule proposed by the SEC.26 The Court 
held that a person trading on material, non-public information commits 
illegal insider trading only if he had a duty to his counterparty to disclose 
the information beforehand.27 Such a duty arises from a corporate insider’s 
fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders. 28  Under the Chiarella 
standard, non-insiders who learn of material, non-public information have 
no duty to disclose before trading on that information.29 This had the effect 
of doing away with the “parity of information” standard, in which any 
investor with material information has a duty to disclose that information 
before trading on the basis of that information.30 In striking down the parity 
standard, the Court denied the existence of a general duty between market 
participants to abstain from trading on material, non-public information and 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716 (Aug. 24, 
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure Release]. 
 22. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 46–47.  
 23. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. In the Cady, Roberts & Co. Release, supra note 12, the SEC argued: 
Insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but 
which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their 
investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a 
violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand, disclosure prior to effecting a 
purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the 
alternative is to forego the transaction. 
 27. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); see also SZOCKYJ, supra 
note 11, at 44. 
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noted that “neither Congress nor the [SEC] ever has adopted a parity-of-
information rule.”31 
Dirks v. SEC expanded the definition of an insider but also placed an 
important restriction on the transmission of a duty to disclose or abstain 
from an inside “tipper” to an outside “tippee.”32 In that case, Raymond 
Dirks, a prominent insurance industry investment analyst, received a tip 
from a former officer of Equity Funding of America.33 The officer, Ronald 
Secrist, stated that the value of Equity Funding’s assets had been 
significantly overstated due to a massive and ongoing fraud at his former 
employer. 34  Secrist also told Dirks that securities regulators had been 
informed and had taken no action, and he asked Dirks to verify his 
allegations independently.35 Dirks did so and passed on his findings to a 
number of his clients.36 Dirks also went to the Wall Street Journal with the 
information he uncovered about the fraud, but the reporter declined to 
publish the story, apparently fearing a libel lawsuit.37 Subsequently, several 
of the clients Dirks tipped off sold their interests in Equity Funding, thereby 
avoiding massive losses.38 The SEC found that Dirks had engaged in illegal 
insider trading as a tipper, but, in recognition of his role in bringing the 
Equity Funding scandal to light, only censured him. 39  Dirks appealed, 
perhaps recognizing the grave damage that even the relatively light sanction 
would do to his reputation as an investment analyst, and ultimately the 
Supreme Court overturned his conviction.40 In deciding that Dirks could not 
be held liable for insider trading, the Court held that tippees only inherit the 
Cady, Roberts 41  duty to disclose when they receive material nonpublic 
information improperly, that is, from a person who breaches his or her 
fiduciary duty by passing along the information.42 Secrist had not violated 
any duty to his employer because he neither expected to nor actually 
received any benefit by disclosing his company’s fraud to Dirks.43 
In 1997, the Supreme Court expanded the law of insider trading when it 
upheld the securities fraud conviction of James H. O’Hagan.44 O’Hagan had 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. The parity of information standard had been formulated and 
adopted by the appellate court in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.  
 32. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661–62 (1983). 
 33. Id. at 649–50.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 650.  
 38. Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 39. Id. at 650–52 (majority opinion).  
 40. Id. at 652.  
 41. See supra note 26; see also SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); 
SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 40–43. 
 42. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655–56.  
 43. Id. at 662.  
 44. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). The Supreme Court had previously heard 
a case involving the misappropriation theory in 1987, Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 
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been a partner at Dorsey & Whitney LLP and obtained information about a 
pending tender offer that his firm was working on.45 Although O’Hagan did 
no work on the representation, and as such was not a temporary insider,46 he 
was convicted of insider trading.47 In upholding the conviction, the Court 
noted that a fiduciary who “[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly 
converting the principal’s information for personal gain . . . dupes or 
defrauds the principal,” 48  and further that “[a] company's confidential 
information, we recognized in Carpenter, qualifies as property to which the 
company has a right of exclusive use.”49 These Supreme Court decisions 
indicate that the Court views insider trading as a crime consisting of fraud 
and involving breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, that is, the theft of 
information and the transformation of that information into profit or 
avoidance of loss.50 
II. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
Several policy concerns have been advanced as an explanation for the 
current insider trading regime. 51  Chief among these are fairness, the 
promotion of investor confidence in the marketplace, and the right of 
corporations to have exclusive use of their intellectual property. 52  The 
fairness justification is premised on the idea that insider trading harms 
shareholders and is fundamentally unfair to investors without the same 
access to information that insiders possess.53 As noted above, the Supreme 
Court rejected the fairness justification when it refused to recognize a 
general duty between market participants in Chiarella.54 The Court returned 
to this theme again when it decided Dirks v. SEC: 
                                                                                                                 
(1987), in which R. Foster Winans’ conviction for insider trading was upheld. The Court 
deadlocked 4–4 on the issue of whether Winans could be held liable for misappropriation but 
voted to uphold his wire fraud conviction. 
 45. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.  
 46. A temporary insider is an outsider like an investment banker, accountant, outside attorney, 
or broker who comes to possess a corporate client’s confidential information in the course of his 
duties to the client. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. Such individuals are prohibited from trading on 
this information on the same theory as “traditional” insiders. See id.  
 47. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.  
 48. Id. at 653.  
 49. Id. at 654 (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19).  
 50. Not all insider trading cases involve a breach of duty or conversion. The SEC has 
promulgated rule 14e-3, which provides for the prosecution of persons who trade ahead of a 
tender offer, no matter where the information comes from and whether or not the trader is 
affiliated with either the offeror or the target. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2014). The constitutionality 
of this rule has been challenged, but the O’Hagan Court held that, at least with respect to that 
particular case, the SEC did not exceed its constitutional rulemaking authority. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. at 644.  
 51. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 
21–26 (1991); see also ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 130–34.  
 52. See MACEY, supra note 51, at 23–24.  
 53. Id.  
 54.  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
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[O]ur opinion in Chiarella [repudiated] any notion that traders must enjoy 
equal access to information before trading: “[The] ‘information’ theory is 
rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches 
only when a party has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply 
with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws.” We 
reaffirm today that “[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship 
between parties . . . and not merely from one’s ability to acquire 
information because of his position in the market.”55 
Why then does the fairness theory of enforcement retain such 
significant popularity with the SEC and Congress? One reason is that the 
public perceives insider trading as “cheating,”56 a method of trading and 
making money not available to the general public; this is combined with a 
historic lack of organized industry opposition. 57  Another more cynical 
interpretation of the fairness theory’s survival and continued popularity is 
that it plays well in the media and allows the SEC to maintain its power, 
influence, and moral high ground within the federal government and the 
financial industry.58 Insider trading cases, focused as they generally are on 
one or a group of individuals as opposed to a monolithic firm, have the 
advantage of character and personal drama to pique the public’s interest and 
keep the regulator and U.S. Attorney in the spotlight.59 Finally, there is the 
notion that insider trading results in identifiable harm to investors and 
shareholders. The Supreme Court commented on this in the Dirks case: 
[I]n many cases there may be no clear causal connection between inside 
trading and outsiders’ losses. In one sense, as market values fluctuate and 
investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information, there are 
always winners and losers; but those who have “lost” have not necessarily 
been defrauded. On the other hand, inside trading for personal gain is 
fraudulent, and is a violation of the federal securities laws.60 
The lack of demonstrable harm to any one investor is dealt with by the 
“property right” theory of insider trading.61 The right of a corporation to 
have exclusive use of its proprietary information, in the nature of a property 
right, is the theoretical basis for the illegality of the misappropriation 
theory.62 The theory can also be applied to classical insider trading; such an 
adaptation goes something like this: “[F]irms often incur great expense to 
develop [their] information. To deny these firms the ability to exploit this 
information fully for profit diminishes the wealth of the shareholders who 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657–58 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 
 56. SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 2.  
 57. Id. at 24–26. 
 58. See id. at 28–31; see also MACEY, supra note 51, at 52.  
 59. MACEY, supra note 51, at 67–68.  
 60. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666 n.27.  
 61. ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 129; see also MACEY, supra note 51, at 44–45.  
 62. MACEY, supra note 51, at 44–45.  
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have paid for the creation of the information.”63 A property right conception 
of insider trading means that any executive, director, or other insider 
violates his fiduciary duty to his company by using corporate assets for his 
own benefit, instead of for that of the company. 64 On the flip side, an 
outsider owing a duty of trust and confidence to the company would be 
liable for simple conversion of corporate intellectual property for his own 
benefit.65 
 Another plausible theoretical justification for insider trading 
regulation is the notion that insider trading undermines the integrity of the 
securities markets by reducing investor confidence in the fairness and 
equity of those markets.66 Investors will avoid the markets, the theory goes, 
if they feel that they have little chance of competing with the inside 
knowledge of insiders and the select few with whom they share their 
information; potential market participants want a level playing field before 
they will engage in securities trading.67 This argument has been criticized 
by some as a disguised retread of the fairness argument, replacing the value 
proposition that equality of information is the only fair context for trading 
in securities with the assertion that unless all parties believe they have equal 
access to information, they will not trade.68 Investment analysts and other 
securities market professionals constantly strive for an informational 
advantage over their counterparties by collecting and analyzing all of the 
publicly available information about a company in order to take advantage 
of pricing inefficiencies in the company’s securities.69 This group of market 
professionals will always have an advantage over less-informed investors 
by virtue of their superior research and analysis capabilities.70 
One of the ways that market professionals maintain an informational 
advantage is by using their superior resources to poke around in the guts of 
companies in which they wish to invest.71 Many employ channel checkers 
to track supply-chain information that could provide a window into a 
company’s inner workings, or they engage in supply-chain channel checks 
themselves.72 However, recent commentary suggests that the SEC takes a 
dim view of this practice, at least in situations where it leads to an analyst 
learning confidential information about a company.73 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 52.  
 64. ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 129.  
 65. See MACEY, supra note 51, at 44–45.  
 66. Id. at 41.  
 67. Id. at 23–24.  
 68. See id. at 43.  
 69. ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 131.  
 70. MACEY, supra note 51, at 41–42.  
 71. See Wallack, supra note 4, at A1. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Pradheep Sampath, “How’s Business?” Could be a Federal Offence, SUPPLY CHAIN EUR., 
Jan./Feb. 2011, at 50. 
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III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CHANNEL CHECKS AND  
SUPPLY-CHAIN RESEARCH 
A. DEFINITION OF A CHANNEL CHECK AND COMMON USES IN 
INVESTMENT RESEARCH 
Channel checks take a number of forms, including conversations 
between analysts and supply-side sources, independent surveys of franchise 
outlets, aggregation of shipping or trucking data, and simply counting the 
cars in the parking lot outside of Best Buy.74 The checks under scrutiny are 
those conducted between an investment analyst and a current or former 
employee of a company engaged in supplying parts, expertise, or other 
significant “building blocks” to a larger company.75 The channel check is 
an especially crucial tool for investment analysts because of the increasing 
prevalence of production outsourcing; its importance is ably summed up by 
Pradheep Sampath: 
It’s a sign of the times that most companies don’t do most of their own 
manufacturing; they use contract manufacturers, subcontractors and so on. 
So, anyone wanting to find out how a company is performing has to go 
beyond that company to get a quasi-decent picture of performance. 
Financial analysts have ‘got’ this; so, particularly for the more secretive 
and sensitive supply chains, they are delving ever deeper into the 
manufacturers, distribution partners, and warehouse operations, looking at 
production levels and raw material flows to piece together a picture from 
which they can advise investors and other clients. They may not have got 
all or any of this information from the ‘channel master,’ but such ‘channel 
checkers’ have a leg up in the investment game.76 
Channel checks are not limited to technology companies. The method is 
also useful to analysts who follow retailers, restaurant chains, and other 
service-industry companies. 77  These analysts often visit stores and 
restaurants to see how much traffic they get, what their prices look like 
compared to the previous week or month, and any other information they 
can glean.78 In some cases, expert networking firms or third-party research 
firms facilitate these conversations by connecting the analyst to an industry 
expert or employee with relevant information; in other cases, these third 
parties perform the research themselves and sell it to buy-side analysts.79 
Channel checks are part of the investment research that many financial 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.  
 75. Madrigal, supra note 3.  
 76. Sampath, supra note 73, at 50. 
 77. Serena Ng, Channel Checkers Sniff Around for Trends, WALL ST. J. ASIA FELLOWSHIP 
NYU (Aug. 8, 2005), http://wsjfellowship.com/2009/01/channel-checkers/. 
 78. Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.  
 79. See Jenny Anderson, Wall Street ‘Matchmakers’ Under New York Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 7, 2007, at C5; see also Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.  
2014] Regulating Channel Checks 479 
analysts perform on public companies, either to identify potential 
investment targets or evaluate a current position.80 It is not uncommon for 
analysts and officers of financial firms that perform analysis to rely at least 
in part on their channel checks when making a recommendation.81 
B. THE MOSAIC THEORY 
One of the ways that some analysts use information obtained by 
channel checks is commonly referred to as “mosaic theory.” 82  Mosaic 
theory is the practice of seeking out and combining all public and material 
information, as well as non-public, non-material information, to paint a 
larger picture of the company being targeted for investment.83 Also called 
the “scuttlebutt method,”84 an analyst employing a mosaic theory strategy 
may seek out non-public information from within the target company.85 As 
long as the information does not rise to the level of material information, 
such research is legal because the law only prohibits trading on information 
if it is both material and non-public.86 
As a defense to insider trading allegations, mosaic theory is risky. Most 
recently, Raj Rajaratnam claimed that his activities were the product of a 
mosaic theory strategy. 87  One of the biggest risks is the loose term 
“materiality,” which is sometimes defined as a fact that a reasonable 
investor would view as having actual significance in deciding whether to 
invest. 88  In general, things like top-line earnings, confidential company 
performance numbers, and pending acquisitions or mergers are deemed 
material as a matter of law.89 Other facts that may or may not be deemed 
material include possible credit events, changes in management, or changes 
in regulatory expenses or structure.90 In United States v. Rajaratnam, much 
of the information Rajaratnam was accused of obtaining illegally was 
clearly material, including a tip about Berkshire Hathaway’s September 
2008 agreement to make a $5 billion investment in Goldman Sachs. 91 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See Wallack, supra note 4, at A1. 
 81. See Ng, supra note 77.  
 82. Peter J. Henning, Why Insider Trading Is Wrong, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 11, 2011, 
3:51 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/11/why-is-insider-trading-wrong/. 
 83.  See Pradheep Sampath, Where Supply Chains Meet Insider Trading, ALL ABOUT B2B 
(Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.gxsblogs.com/sampathp/2010/11/channel-check-where-supply-
chains-meet-insider-trading.html.  
 84. PHILIP A. FISHER, COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS 44–45 (1958). 
 85. Henning, supra note 82.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.; see also Michael Rothfeld & Chad Bray, The Galleon Case: Loss Raises Questions 
over Defense Strategy, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2011, at C1. 
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Rajaratnam’s attorneys, however, argued that the information was not 
“economically” material, that is, it was already reflected in the stock prices 
of the companies in which he traded.92 Whether or not this argument is 
plausible, it is becoming increasingly clear that the definition of materiality 
is more or less whatever the government retroactively decides it should 
be.93 On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court and SEC have rejected 
suggestions that they formulate a more concrete definition of materiality.94 
Though the practice is nominally legal, channel checkers who subscribe to 
the mosaic theory put themselves in harm’s way because of the 
government’s refusal to clarify its position.95 
C. EXPERT NETWORKS 
Expert networks are consulting firms that specialize in connecting buy-
side investment analysts with industry experts or high-level employees from 
industries and sectors in which they might wish to invest.96 For example, 
Integrity Research Associates performed a study on expert networking and 
shared its findings: 
Over two-thirds of all investors use expert networks primarily to obtain 
market and company background pertaining to the various investment 
theses they are researching. Following this, European users are most likely 
to be interested in forecasts and macro/economic issues, while North 
American users are most likely to be interested in current trends. 
Accounting and legal issues are significantly more likely to be of interest 
to North American users than their European counterparts.97 
The recent insider trading cases are not, however, focused on the use of 
expert networks as background. They concern consultants and employees of 
the expert networks who passed material, non-public information to hedge 
funds and other investors.98 
The expert networking industry arose as an unintended consequence of 
one of the SEC’s own regulations intended to even the playing field for 
smaller investors—Regulation FD.99 In the wake of Dirks v. SEC, the SEC 
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was concerned that investment professionals regularly obtained material 
information about issuers prior to disclosure to the general marketplace, 
giving such professionals an unfair competitive advantage.100 Regulation 
FD was designed to prevent selective disclosure to certain analysts, 
disclosure that the SEC believed gave those analysts and their employers an 
unfair trading advantage.101 Regulation FD cut off the flow of information 
that analysts had come to rely on from top corporate executives by 
forbidding selective disclosure to certain classes of persons, including 
anyone associated with a broker-dealer.102 In response, companies began 
using channel checks, often with the help of third-party research firms, to 
find out crucial supply data about their investment targets. 103  Many 
companies are now pulling back from these expert networks out of fear of 
being implicated in one of the current insider trading scandals.104 In fact, 
some analysts predict that, without more clarity from the SEC on the limits 
of an expert network’s uses, the entire industry could go belly-up.105 
1. SEC Commentary on the Use of Expert Networks 
On February 3, 2011, the SEC announced that it would bring insider 
trading charges against several consultants and employees of Primary 
Global Research LLC, an expert networking firm.106 In the announcement, 
the SEC acknowledged that there was nothing inherently illegal about the 
primary function of expert networks: providing expert advice and 
analysis.107 On February 8, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York, Preet Bharara, stated that the government is only pursuing 
systematic, brazen violations of the insider trading laws in the context of the 
expert networking industry. 108  He also tacitly endorsed the practice of 
channel checking by stating that there was “nothing inherently wrong with 
or bad about hedge funds or expert networking firms or aggressive market 
research for that matter. Nothing at all.”109 When pressed, Bharara refused 
to answer substantively a question about where the line was drawn between 
experts and analysts’ “legitimate” conversations and the illegal sharing of 
inside information.110 
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Since Bharara and SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami refuse 
to provide any more information about what will be considered material111 
or who will be pursued next, the way forward for analysts who use expert 
networks is unclear. Khuzami urged companies who use expert networks to 
increase compliance, without addressing the core issue of what constitutes 
an illegal tip. 112  More troubling for the expert networking industry are 
comments made in February 2012 by David Rosenfeld, Associate Regional 
Director of the New York Regional Office of the SEC.113 Rosenfeld stated 
that no corporate executive should ever work with an expert network and 
implied that such activity could violate Reg FD and the laws against insider 
trading.114 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT REGIME 
A. LACK OF CLARITY ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF CHANNEL CHECKS 
REDUCES THE AMOUNT AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION 
AVAILABLE TO THE MARKET 
Banning or disincentivizing aggressive research may limit the amount 
of public information firms use in their analyses as they take precautionary 
steps back. The costs of compliance and the amount of human capital 
needed to ensure that expert networks and channel checkers are on the right 
side of the insider trading laws are already enormous and growing rapidly 
in the wake of the Primary Global Research cases.115 Because it is still 
unclear exactly where the line is drawn between research and improper 
access to and use of inside information, large investors must sift through the 
facts of each case and try not to engage in such behavior.116 It is likely that 
their analysis will lead them to create a “buffer” zone of legal investment 
research left undone to insulate themselves from even the appearance of 
impropriety, or firms may even eschew the services of research firms 
altogether.117 For example, it is perfectly legal for an employee at a given 
company to discuss non-material, public information with an investor, as 
long as his or her employer does not forbid that kind of contact.118 Such 
conversations have historically played an important role in channel 
checks. 119  Without a clear definition of what qualifies as material 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Charlie Gasparino & Sital Patel, Exclusive: Regulators May Expand Definition of Insider 
Trading, FOX BUS. (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/02/15 
/regulators-may-expand-definition-insider-trading/. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Rusli, supra note 6, at 24.  
 116. See id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Anderson, supra note 79, at C5.  
 119. See id.  
2014] Regulating Channel Checks 483 
information, however, the investor may not call, and the employee may not 
pick up. The legal definition of materiality is so vague that almost any 
information passed from an insider carries risks both for the insider and the 
analyst. 120  The SEC has also resisted providing a clearer definition of 
materiality, apparently in order to broaden the types of conduct against 
which it can bring enforcement actions.121 Summed up in a few words, the 
risk of unclear regulation is that it will be difficult for either party to tell 
“which bits of information are ‘material’ and which are just ‘really 
awesome,’”122 since “[t]he gray area is vast.”123 
The effect of this lack of clarity will be to reduce the market’s 
efficiency at pricing investment securities. 124  If information is excluded 
from an analyst’s report or is never uncovered to begin with, the price of the 
relevant security may not accurately reflect its true value in light of all the 
public, material facts available.125 Efficient pricing is desirable because it 
contributes to market liquidity and low-cost access to the securities markets, 
allowing investors to buy securities safe in the knowledge that the price is 
accurate.126 
The market efficiency argument, by its nature, ignores the “fairness” 
justification for insider trading regulation, focusing only on the efficiency 
benefits of allowing trading on inside information.127 However, the broader 
perception, shared by many at the SEC, is that unequal access to 
information may be unfair to the small investor. 128  What justifies this 
unequal access to information? The short answer, of course, is that such 
large investors pay for it, either by paying their own analysts or a third-
party research group.129 Here there is another gray area between paying for 
legitimate research and offering a bribe for inside information, the latter of 
which was alleged in several of the Primary Global Research cases. 130 
Some of the information allegedly passed from the consultants in those 
cases, like quarterly revenue and gross profits, can be fairly classified as 
material under almost any test.131 Some consultants, however, passed along 
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information that was less clearly material, such as what orders a supplier 
expected from a large client.132 More importantly, the hedge fund clients 
often declined to invest in the company whose information was 
communicated but did invest in companies either up or down the supply 
chain.133 If the parity of information standard is applied, all of the conduct 
just described appears illegal because it is unfair to investors who cannot 
afford to purchase such information. This is a plausible argument, but it 
does not comport with the current Supreme Court view of the grounds for a 
misappropriation charge; a party must have, and violate, a fiduciary duty to 
another by passing along or trading on information that is both material and 
nonpublic.134 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that independent, aggressive 
research is important to the efficiency and honesty of the securities 
markets. 135  Indeed, the Court acknowledged that such analysis plays a 
crucial role in keeping markets healthy and companies honest: 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly 
receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it 
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which 
the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy 
market. It is commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze 
information,” and this often is done by meeting with and questioning 
corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information that the 
analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
worth of a corporation’s securities . . . . [I]t is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information 
cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s 
stockholders or the public generally.136 
This analysis reaffirms the general principle that insider trading liability 
is premised on a breach of fiduciary duty and not mere possession of 
material, non-public information. Firms who engage in channel checking 
and other aggressive research put money and time into developing and 
synthesizing that research into a cohesive picture of an issuer’s structure, 
performance, and attractiveness as an investment. 137  Must firms, in the 
interest of fairness, disclose the product of such research to the public 
before using it to avoid liability? Alternatively, must they expend even 
more time and money to discover and quarantine inside information passed 
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on inadvertently?138 The first solution is problematic because it would result 
in free-riding139 and remove the incentive for firms to spend money on 
analysts and research in order to gain a competitive advantage. Since 
“information cannot be enjoyed in limitless quantities by everyone, 
individuals and firms will not find it sensible to invest in producing 
information if they cannot profit from it.” 140  The second may similarly 
reduce the incentive to engage in aggressive research because it would 
require firms to spend more money on compliance and legal analysis, 
leaving less of a margin for profit.141 
The current regime may also result in prosecution of analysts 
performing research in good faith and makes it significantly more difficult 
for those analysts to effectively perform their research. 142 Analysts take 
steps to protect themselves from liability but may come to possess inside 
information accidentally.143 Preet Bharara of the U.S. Attorney’s Office has 
stated that the authorities are not pursuing those who do not intentionally 
seek out inside information,144 but neither he nor the SEC has articulated an 
intelligible standard about what constitutes intent. The SEC has also cast a 
wide net with respect to what qualifies as material, non-public information 
and has seemingly expanded the definition of a duty of trust and confidence 
to include non-disclosure agreements with suppliers or customers. 145 As 
early as 1993, scholars noted that the vagueness of the insider trading 
statutes incented the SEC to expand its reach,146 and the SEC has done so—
except in cases where it is halted by the Supreme Court. 147  The SEC 
continues to insist that its definition of insider trading is clear enough, that 
its rules provide a “bright line,” and that analysts should know when they 
cross that line.148 
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B. THE SEC LACKS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EXPAND THE 
DEFINITION OF INSIDER TRADING 
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 
the government has sought to expand the definition of insider trading to 
include possession and use of material, nonpublic information by any 
person, sometimes known as the “fairness” standard. 149  The Texas Gulf 
Sulphur court reasoned that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act could be 
read to require that  
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it 
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to 
protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain 
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such 
inside information remains undisclosed.150  
Three Supreme Court cases since Texas Gulf Sulphur have limited insider 
trading liability to those who have some species of fiduciary duty requiring 
them to disclose or abstain.151 
The basic limitations are these: to be liable for insider trading, an 
individual must have, and breach, a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the 
company in whose securities he proposes to trade,152 or a fiduciary-like 
duty of trust and confidence to the source of the inside information.153 An 
individual who would otherwise meet neither standard inherits the duty to 
disclose or abstain only if he received the inside information from a person 
he knew had a duty not to share such information and the person sharing the 
information in breach of his duty received a benefit from doing so.154 The 
equality of information standard urged by the SEC “differs little from the 
view that [the Supreme Court] rejected as inconsistent with Congressional 
intent in Chiarella.”155 In the absence of the fiduciary duty requirement, the 
SEC rule would have no limiting factor, exposing analysts to unrestrained 
litigation risk; “without legal limitations, market participants are forced to 
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rely on the reasonableness of the SEC’s litigation strategy, but that can be 
hazardous.”156 
The SEC’s investigation of channel checking is premised largely on the 
notion that employees of supply companies who share information with 
analysts do so in breach of an express or implied duty of confidentiality to 
the customer.157 This is analogous to the O’Hagan standard,158 but it goes 
too far. A finding of liability under O’Hagan requires that the accused have 
misappropriated confidential, material, non-public information, in breach of 
a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, for the purposes of 
securities trading.159 A fiduciary duty is defined as  
[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a 
fiduciary (such as a lawyer or corporate officer) to the beneficiary (such as 
a lawyer’s client or a shareholder); a duty to act with the highest degree of 
honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of the 
other person (such as the duty that one partner owes to another).160  
In the absence of a confidentiality agreement falling under rule 10b5-2, this 
definition does not describe the nature of the relationship between an 
employee of a given supplier and that supplier’s customer. An argument 
could be made that, regardless of his duty to the customer, an employee 
always owes such a duty to his employer as the employer’s agent; this is 
accurate, but if the information in question is classified as the property of 
the customer, passing it on does not breach a duty to the employer since it is 
the customer, not the employer, who enjoys exclusive use under 
O’Hagan.161 
One possible criticism of this line of reasoning is that the SEC has 
historically been given broad authority by the courts to shape its regulatory 
regime, especially in the context of insider trading.162 The Supreme Court 
held that the SEC did not exceed its authority in promulgating rule 14e-3, 
which prohibits trading on inside information concerning a tender offer, 
whether or not the trader had a duty to either the offeror or the offerees.163 
The rulemaking authority there specified that the SEC could make any rules 
needed to prevent fraudulent conduct in connection with a tender offer.164 
However, in granting that authority through the passage of the Williams 
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Act,165 Congress also noted that its preferred method of market regulation 
was through disclosure rather than “court-imposed principles of 
‘fairness.’” 166  The difference between the wording of section 10(b) and 
Congress’s express intent to limit regulation on the grounds of fairness 
suggests by counterfactual inference that rule 10b-5 still requires a nexus of 
duty between an alleged insider trader/tipper and the owner of the 
information.167 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. THE SEC SHOULD FORMULATE GUIDELINES FOR  
CHANNEL CHECKERS 
To reduce the instances of insider trading, investors need guidance in 
order to police themselves more effectively. Such guidelines should not 
completely preclude aggressive, independent research. As noted earlier, 
channel checks and other forms of independent research are an important 
check on companies, preventing them from fooling the investment public 
with vague or even inaccurate disclosure. 168  It is well known that 
“[c]ompanies routinely claim to be doing well and do not like being 
contradicted, but that is the task of investors, analysts and the media.”169 
Limiting such research must be done in a way that does not give companies 
the ability to lie to the public and get away with it—independent research 
can allow hedge funds and other market-moving investors to move the price 
of an entity in a way that signals its overall financial health. Crippling the 
research capabilities of large investors would render efforts to predict a 
company’s future performance or current fair value “mere guesswork.”170 
Companies who wish to prevent channel checking may take steps to protect 
their information by imposing non-disclosure agreements on their 
suppliers.171 In such a situation, SEC rule 10b5-2 would allow enforcement 
actions against both the tipper and the tippee, provided the information is 
material and non-public. 172  Otherwise, the SEC becomes a tool for 
companies hiding damaging information.173 
The SEC has taken the position that a non-disclosure agreement creates 
a relationship of trust and confidence sufficient to warrant a 
misappropriation charge if breached. 174  However, at least one court has 
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questioned rule 10b5-2, noting that it conflates a confidentiality agreement 
with a fiduciary-like relationship.175 The court went on to note that in some 
cases, a confidentiality agreement could give rise to a fiduciary-like duty, 
but only one including terms that bore the hallmarks of such a duty.176 
Several of the charges against former Primary Global Research consultants 
contained the phrase, “non-disclosure agreements between [company x] and 
[company y] governed all of this type of information,”177 implying that any 
non-disclosure agreement creates a fiduciary-like duty of trust and 
confidence between the employee of the supplier and the customer. 
The most recent cases of insider trading brought by the SEC have 
focused more on the confidential nature of the information being passed to 
analysts and less on the materiality of that information.178 However, the 
question of materiality is crucial since insider trading liability only ensues if 
the misappropriated information is material.179 Whether channel checking 
remains a valid method of research will depend in large part on whether the 
SEC expands the definition of materiality to include practically any 
confidential information about a company. 
1. Congress or the SEC Must Clarify the Definition of 
Materiality 
The lack of clarity over the definition of materiality has led to 
confusion among large investors and accusations that the SEC intentionally 
keeps the definition broad so it can decide what kinds of conduct to attack 
without coming under attack for ex post lawmaking. 180  Some in the 
financial industry reject this idea, claiming in essence that materiality is so 
obvious that, as Justice Potter Stewart famously said,181 one should “know 
it when they see it.” 182  Stephen Taub claims that there is a wide gulf 
between inside information and channel-checking activity, restricting the 
term “channel check” to activities like visiting retail outlets and counting 
cars in store parking lots.183 This is an artificial limitation as the industry 
often uses the term to refer to activities like calls to employees at supply or 
customer companies. 184  The risk of the “know it when they see it” 
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definition of materiality is that it leaves open the possibility of judicial or 
regulatory expansion. Even a good-faith effort to implement compliance 
policies to prevent transmission of material information may not be enough 
to avoid receiving such information and as such being subject to insider 
trading liability.185 For example, when a piece of information is just one 
part of an investment thesis or analyst report but forms an important part of 
the mosaic,186 is it material?187 After all, it does add to the total mix of 
information, and it may be difficult to determine whether it adds 
“significantly” or simply to some unspecified extent. 
The SEC should provide a definition of what constitutes “material 
information” for the purposes of insider trading liability, marking certain 
types of information as clearly material and strictly off-limits for 
discussion. A definition would not have to preclude the SEC from pursuing 
actions for the sharing of non-listed items, but rather could provide a good 
guide to investors and analysts to keep them out of trouble. Off-limits 
information should include pre-release earnings numbers, cash flow figures, 
and other important financial data. This may be done in conjunction with a 
determination of materiality of at least some types of information. The 
cases brought against experts and channel checkers at this point have 
primarily involved clearly material information like pre-publication 
earnings numbers.188 There may come a time, though, when the materiality 
of the information obtained by an analyst is not so clear. Channel checks by 
their nature involve development of information that most investors do not 
have, and a more even-handed approach would be for the SEC to develop 
materiality guidelines to supplement the Court’s general definition of 
materiality. 
The Supreme Court has previously refused to adopt a bright-line test of 
materiality in connection with alleged false and misleading statements made 
in contravention of rule 10b-5.189 In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 
a pharmaceutical company failed to disclose certain adverse events relating 
to its cold remedy product and defended on the ground that the events were 
statistically insignificant.190 The Court did not agree that an adverse event 
must be statistically significant, holding that, since investors may act on a 
non-statistically significant event, such an event, if disclosed, may be 
deemed to have significantly altered the total mix of information available 
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to an investor.191 This is a signal that the Court wishes to reserve for itself 
broad discretion in determining what information is material. 
Not everyone in the SEC thought it wise to leave the definition of 
materiality open to interpretation. 192  Former SEC chairman John Shad 
attempted to draft a definition of materiality ahead of the passage of the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act but was unable to do so before the legislation 
was passed in 1983.193 Senator Donald Riegel, Chair of the Subcommittee 
on Securities, spoke out in favor of such a definition, noting that the courts 
have interpreted the current test inconsistently: 
Unfortunately, the courts have not interpreted fraud as it relates to insider 
trading with any degree of consistency or clarity. As a result, not even 
lawyers, let alone members of the public, can be sure from one court case 
to another what the state of the law actually is in this area . . . . I think 
that’s really an unacceptable situation and has to be changed.194 
The last attempt to impose a definition on the question of materiality 
was defeated by the fear that a savvy trader or defense lawyer would find a 
way around it.195 This Note argues that such a fear is unjustified, as long as 
the SEC is willing to limit itself to situations in which illegal insider trading 
has actually occurred and refrains from pursuing traders who either lack a 
duty to any issuer or have simply collected enough information to attain an 
advantage not shared by the general public. To keep the current definition is 
to have a rule without limit, which the Supreme Court disapproved in Dirks 
v. SEC.196 
B. SAFE HARBOR WHEN SCIENTER CANNOT BE SHOWN 
The most glaring problem with aggressively prosecuting analysts for 
channel-checking-related insider trading is that it may cast too wide a net 
and include those who unintentionally obtain misappropriated information. 
Liability for insider trading under the misappropriation theory, the only 
conceivable grounds for a prosecution flowing from channel-checking 
activities, requires willful breach of a recognized duty.197 In the case of a 
channel check, the original duty would necessarily lie with the insider 
passing along information to the analyst.198 In order for liability to pass to 
the analyst as a tippee, that analyst would have to receive the information 
knowing that the insider violated a duty not to disclose it.199 This creates a 
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catch-22 for the analyst since confidentiality agreements are often 
themselves subject to confidentiality, preventing the insider from disclosing 
whether he has a duty to keep certain information secret.200 
Expert networks are also a problem since high compensation for 
providing information about a company may incentivize consultants to 
provide information covered by a confidentiality agreement without 
disclosing such an agreement.201 Some former expert network consultants 
charge that their former employers would intentionally neglect to ask about 
any confidentiality agreements in order to try to avoid the scienter element 
of insider trading liability.202 
In order to avoid the prosecution of innocent analysts, the SEC should 
carve out an exemption for those who legitimately were not aware that their 
source was speaking in violation of a duty of trust and confidence to the 
customer of the source’s company. This could be accomplished by working 
with industry compliance experts to formulate the appropriate questions and 
disclosures that analysts may ask sources to determine what sorts of 
information they are permitted to share. Investment professionals have 
already begun beefing up compliance programs and examining their 
communications with supply-chain personnel to avoid liability for insider 
trading.203  
In the past, the SEC has worked with regulated entities on thorny issues 
like channel checking. When high-frequency trading firms became 
controversial because of the 2010 “flash crash” attributed to their trading 
style, the SEC solicited input from such firms to better understand how to 
tailor regulations that would be effective and fair. 204  Recently, high-
frequency trading has come under fire from some Wall Street traders, who 
accuse firms of using the strategy to front-run other investors without 
providing any useful capital to corporate participants in the equity 
markets.205 By contrast, channel checks are used to evaluate the long-term 
financial health and growth potential of a particular company—a slow and 
analytical process designed to evaluate the most efficient allocation of 
investment capital. A discussion of the relative merits of high frequency 
trading and long-term investment is beyond the scope of this Note, but if 
the SEC is willing to collaborate with high-frequency trading firms, it 
should be willing to work with investors who use channel checks.  
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CONCLUSION 
The debate over whether channel checking and the use of expert 
networks should be legal involves a policy-based and technical analysis of 
the insider trading laws. It forces us to look at the tension between a purely 
fairness-based system, where the government ensures that all market 
participants have access to exactly the same information at the same time, 
and a purely efficiency-based system, where information about a given 
security is impounded in its price the moment it is created or becomes 
known.206 The answer, I think, lies somewhere between these two extremes. 
It does no good to enforce a pure fairness standard because to do so 
damages the efficiency of the markets, exposes market participants to 
nearly unlimited risk at the discretion of the SEC, and allows companies 
with adverse events to hide them from the public, if not forever, at least for 
some time. Such a standard is also contrary to established law at the 
Supreme Court level. At the same time, it is against our social conscience to 
allow some in-the-know individuals to profit at the expense of those who 
have limited access to inside information.  
The incentive to make large amounts of money will always induce 
some to violate the law. 207  However, it undermines our market system 
when, in search of those bad actors, we punish those who work to develop 
and disseminate independent research. Instead, the government and the 
securities industry should work towards a more tailored approach that 
allows the government to police bad actors and gives securities 
professionals an idea of where the “line” is that separates legal from illegal 
conduct. Perfect efficiency and perfect fairness are difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve; however, there is much to be said for an attempt to 
balance both. The key is to find a solution that does not shut down 
securities markets by over-regulation of legitimate, in-depth research, but 
leaves tools for the SEC and U.S. Department of Justice to discipline those 
who have actually misappropriated material, non-public information. 
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